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Further Standing Lessons 
HEATHER ELLIOTT * 
The Article III standing doctrine—with its three requirements of injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability1—is often criticized as a restriction that prevents 
liberal, but not conservative, plaintiffs from proceeding in the federal courts.2 
Standing doctrine has, however, increasingly been an issue in many cases involving 
conservative litigants: as I have already discussed in the Indiana Law Journal, the 
standing doctrine has posed significant problems for conservative plaintiffs 
challenging the landmark federal health-care law, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA); to conservative plaintiffs challenging the Obama 
Administration’s expansion of funding for stem-cell research; and to conservative 
appellants defending the federal Defense of Marriage Act and California’s 
constitutional ban on marriage between same-sex couples.3 We now have Supreme 
Court decisions in the health-care and marriage equality cases, and the standing 
analyses—or lack thereof in the health-care case—create problems for standing 
doctrine more generally.  
I had initially concluded that the health-care case presented fairly ordinary 
standing issues that the Court would address using ordinary standing analysis.4 In 
the end, and surprisingly, the Court avoided the issue altogether: in June 2012, the 
Court held most of the PPACA constitutional5 without even using the word 
“standing.”6  
I had also concluded that the gay-marriage cases were likely to founder on the 
standing issue, even though that outcome was not desirable.7 But in July 2013, the 
Supreme Court found standing for the defenders of the Defense of Marriage Act, 
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 1. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 2. See Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative 
Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 558–562 (2012). As I 
stated in that article, I use the word “liberal” despite its political disfavor. Id. at 552 n.5. 
 3. Id. passim. When I refer to the federal and California cases together, I will call them 
the marriage equality cases. 
 4. Elliott, supra note 2, at 582. 
 5. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 6. See infra Part I.A. 
 7. Elliott, supra note 2, at 573–74. I did note the possibility that the conservative bloc 
of the Supreme Court could find standing despite the weight of doctrine against that 
conclusion, but, as I discuss below, the marriage equality cases produced much stranger 
alignments among the Justices. 
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striking down section 5 of the statute as unconstitutional.8 The Court found 
standing lacking, however, for the defenders of California’s ban on same-sex 
marriage, vacating the Ninth Circuit’s opinion and (because there had never been 
any question that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the initial suit) leaving in place 
the district court’s expansive ruling striking down the ban.9  
All three cases, unfortunately, give support to the common belief that standing is 
merely a means of manipulation: courts will find standing lacking when they wish 
to avoid the merits of cases and ignore standing when they wish to reach the 
merits.10 Indeed, the standing analysis in Perry is so flawed that it can only be seen 
as manipulation. I discuss the unfortunate consequences of this conclusion below.11 
All three cases also highlight the problematic nature of standing’s role in 
enforcing the separation of powers. Despite the Court’s repeated insistence that 
standing “is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers,”12 I have 
shown elsewhere that standing serves this role poorly.13 As I demonstrate below, 
both the health-care case and the marriage equality cases raise important 
separation-of-powers issues and reinforce my conclusion that standing serves 
separation-of-powers goals poorly.14  
In sum, the health-care case and the marriage equality cases are bad news for 
standing doctrine. If the Court continues to use standing as it does in these cases, it 
will undermine its institutional status and reinforce the dangerous belief that 
Supreme Court Justices are politicians who simply happen to be appointed for life. 
I. STANDING (SUB ROSA) IN THE HEALTH-CARE CASE 
The health-care cases in the lower courts may have raised “standing issues [that 
we]re garden variety,”15 but the issues were present and indeed had led to dismissal 
in some cases—even at the appellate level—for lack of standing.16 Yet the Supreme 
Court reached the constitutionality of the PPACA without raising the standing issue 
at all. After showing that the PPACA opinions are void of any meaningful 
discussion of standing, I will discuss the implications of that void. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that a controversy existed 
between Edith Windsor and the United States over her victories in the courts below, despite 
the Obama Administration’s agreement with Windsor that DOMA was unconstitutional). 
 9. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (holding that the appellants lacked 
standing to pursue the appeal). 
 10. E.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3–18, at 131 n.10 (2d ed. 
1988) (noting that sometimes the Court will ignore proper standing inquiry “in its ... zeal to 
reach the merits”). However, in a related article, I have come to the conclusion that, at least 
in the Roberts Court, avoiding standing to reach the merits is actually rare. See Heather 
Elliott, Does The Supreme Court Avoid Standing Problems to Reach the Merits? Evidence 
(or Lack Thereof) from the Roberts Court, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. __ 
(forthcoming 2014). 
 11. See infra Part II.A and C. 
 12. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). 
 13. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008). 
 14. See infra Parts I.B and II.C. 
 15. Elliott, supra note 2, at 588. 
 16. Id. at 575–76 & n.161. 
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A. A Void 
PPACA became law in early 2010,17 and dozens lawsuits challenging its 
requirements—especially the “individual mandate”18—were filed against the 
Obama Administration (“Government”).19 Standing arose as an issue in most of 
those cases.20 The Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari in a case arising 
from the Eleventh Circuit—a case in which the Government had already conceded 
one plaintiff’s standing.21 The Government also did not raise any significant 
standing objections in the Supreme Court, even supporting a motion to substitute 
parties late in the game to remedy potential standing problems.22 By the time the 
case rose to the appellate level, the Government had apparently decided it preferred 
a decision on the merits to dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction.23 
The Court was willing to follow the Government’s lead. Chief Justice Roberts, 
writing for a splintered majority in NFIB,24 never mentions the standing of the 
PPACA challengers.25 A text search of the opinion finds no occurrence of the word 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
 18. Id. § 1501. The so-called individual mandate is the provision of PPACA that requires 
most Americans—with exceptions for those below certain income levels—to purchase health 
insurance or face a penalty. 
 19. Elliott, supra note 2, at 575 n.159. 
 20. Elliott, supra note 2, at 575–78. 
 21. Brief for Appellants at 6 n.1, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), 2011 WL 1461593 (“Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff 
Brown’s challenge to the minimum coverage provision is justiciable.” (citation omitted)). Of 
course, the Government’s concession is not binding on the Court, which is obliged to 
consider standing problems sua sponte. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 22. Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 16 n.5, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 2012 WL 37168 (“The federal government has 
supported a motion in this Court to add as parties two NFIB members whose standing 
allegations are materially identical to those made by Brown before the filing of her 
bankruptcy petition.” (citation omitted)). As I note below, the Government did make a 
standing argument with respect to one aspect of the remedies sought by the plaintiffs. See 
infra Part I.B.2. 
 23. Lyle Denniston, Argument preview: Health care, Part I — The power to decide?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/argument-
preview-health-care-part-i-the-power-to-decide/ (“One issue unites both the challengers and 
defenders of the new Affordable Care Act: they would like to have the Supreme Court 
decide, before summer, the constitutionality of the new Act’s mandate requiring virtually all 
Americans to obtain health insurance by 2014, or pay a penalty with their tax returns until 
they do.”). 
 24. The PPACA case produced one of the split decisions that should be familiar to any 
student of recent Constitutional law, with Chief Justice Roberts obtaining a majority vote for 
only Parts I, II, and III–C of his opinion; he received only two votes other than his own for 
Part IV, and no justices joined him in Parts III–A, III–B, and III–D. Two Justices joined 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence and dissent only partially, another fully.  Four Justices 
dissented. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 25. Id. The Chief Justice does address one threshold jurisdictional matter: whether the 
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“standing” at all in the Chief Justice’s opinion; that opinion also never uses the 
words “Article III” or “justiciable” in any form. A text search of Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence produces the same result. 
This void is surprising, even given the Government’s concessions regarding 
standing. A federal court, whatever its level, is obliged to raise sua sponte any 
standing problem it perceives,26 and a huge number of the cases below raised 
standing concerns,27 as did several of the amici.28 This wide attention to the issue of 
standing should have led the Court to mention the issue, even if simply to say 
“standing is obvious here.” Moreover, even if the Court had originally chosen the 
NFIB case from among the PPACA challenges because it appeared to have no 
standing problems, events in the real world overtook: the named plaintiff went 
bankrupt, and a new plaintiff had to be substituted while the case was pending 
before the Court.29 Yet the word “standing” does not even appear in the Chief’s 
opinion or in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion. 
The dissenting opinion, signed by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, 
does use the word “standing” in its Article III justiciability sense three times,30 but 
the dissenters do not actually contend that any standing problem would have 
prevented the Court from hearing the case. Indeed, at one point, the dissenters 
acknowledge that standing might well be lacking for adjudication of certain 
portions of the case, but that those problems should be ignored: 
It would take years, perhaps decades, for each of its provisions to be 
adjudicated separately—and for some of them (those simply expending 
federal funds) no one may have separate standing. The Federal 
                                                                                                                 
Anti-Injunction Act bans the suit. Id. at 2582–83. 
 26. E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“On every writ 
of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this 
court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound to 
ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested.” (citation omitted)). Cf. 
Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (finding case nonjusticiable despite desire of parties, 
including the United States, to concede issues of jurisdiction and reach the merits of the 
case). 
 27. Elliott, supra note 2, at 575–78. 
 28. Brief for Amici Curiae Tax Law Professors Supporting Vacatur (Anti-Injunction 
Act) at *30 n.3, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 2012 WL 
195304; Brief for Amici Curiae Mortimer Caplin and Sheldon Cohen Urging Vacatur on the 
Anti-Injunction Act Issue in Support of Neither Side at 10–11, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 2012 WL 135049; Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Vacatur (Anti-Injunction Act) at 52–56, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 2012 WL 72455. 
 29. Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 16 n.5, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 2012 WL 37168 (“The federal government has 
supported a motion in this Court to add as parties two NFIB members whose standing 
allegations are materially identical to those made by Brown before the filing of her 
bankruptcy petition.”). 
 30. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2653, 2669, 2671 (2012) 
(dissenting opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito).  
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Government, the States, and private parties ought to know at once 
whether the entire legislation fails.31 
Just like the Government, the Justices apparently wanted to reach the merits of 
the case regardless of any standing hurdles. Thus, in the PPACA opinions, standing 
is the dog that did not bark. 32 
B. Why Such A Void? 
Can we deduce anything from the standing-shaped hole in the PPACA cases? I 
can see at least two lessons that this void teaches.  
1. Lesson One: Courts Do Ignore Standing to Reach the Merits 
First, the PPACA case gives support to the conventional view that standing is 
just a tool for manipulation: courts will ignore standing problems when they wish 
to reach the merits.33 That the Court reached the merits is probably a good thing. 
After all, courts around the country had reached conflicting opinions on the 
constitutionality of the PPACA.34 Had the Supreme Court decided, like some 
appellate courts, to decline the case on standing grounds, great uncertainty would 
have beleaguered implementation of the PPACA for years.35 As the New York 
Times editorialized in March, “putting off judgment on the spurious constitutional 
objections from the law’s opponents would delay putting those arguments to rest—
and likely make it more difficult for the government to provide health coverage to 
millions of Americans who do not have it now.”36 Thus standing should not have 
proved an obstacle in deciding this important case.  
Just because of cases like this one, I have argued that current standing doctrine 
is too restrictive and that standing should always be a prudential doctrine that gives 
the federal courts more flexibility.37 But the PPACA opinion does not actually 
change the existing doctrine of standing to explicitly recognize a more prudential 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. Id. at 2671 (dissenting opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito). 
 32. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES (1894), available at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/834/834-h/834-h.htm (“[Police inspector:] ‘Is there any point 
to which you would wish to draw my attention?’ [Holmes:] ‘To the curious incident of the 
dog in the night-time.’ [Inspector:] ‘The dog did nothing in the night-time.’ [Holmes:] ‘That 
was the curious incident.’”). 
 33. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1758 
(1999). But see generally Elliott, supra note 10 (concluding that the NFIB case is actually 
one of very few cases in the Roberts Court giving support to the common belief that the 
Court ignores standing to reach the merits). 
 34. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (constitutional); 
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(unconstitutional); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (constitutional). 
 35. If no one had standing now, review would have waited until at least 2014, when the 
penalty provisions of the PPACA are to go into effect. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (2013). 
 36. Getting to the Merits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2012, at A26, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/opinion/getting-to-the-merits.html?ref=editorials. 
 37. See Elliott, supra note 2, at 596–97; Elliott, supra note 13, at 517. 
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version of standing. The NFIB majority does not discuss the issue at all, and cases 
in which the Court fails to discuss a jurisdictional issue, even when it clearly takes 
jurisdiction, have no precedential value.38 Moreover, as I argued in Standing 
Lessons, these cases did not present any great opportunity for a revolution in 
standing doctrine. The Court granted certiorari in the most boring of the PPACA 
cases, at least from the standing point of view, and it is unsurprising that the Court 
did not produce a standing blockbuster. 
Unfortunately, because the Court has not adopted a prudential view of the 
standing doctrine (and is unlikely ever to do so), the Court’s failure to address 
standing in NFIB is problematic. When case after case emphasizes the fundamental 
relation between standing and the Court’s constitutional role,39 when case after case 
go into the nitty-gritty details of the plaintiff’s standing,40 and when standing has 
been flagged as an issue below, by amici, and by a change of party before the 
Supreme Court itself, a void like the one here speaks loudly and requires one to ask 
the question, “why no standing analysis?” The best answer is that the Court wanted 
too badly to reach the merits to risk discovering that standing was an obstacle after 
all. 
The Justices do themselves no favors when they reinforce the view that the 
Court is a political body that votes on policy, rather than a panel of judges doing 
their best to review the law and the facts of a case to determine whether the 
judgment below was correct. The more it looks like standing is just a tool the 
Justices use to manipulate their jurisdiction, the more the Court seems like a 
political body than a judicial body, and the more the Court risks losing the respect 
required for its proper functioning within the American political system. 
Fortunately, as I have argued elsewhere, the Roberts Court has only rarely ignored 
obvious standing problems in order to reach the merits.41 
2. Lesson Two: Separation-of-Powers Conflicts Continue to Inhere in Standing 
Doctrine 
Second, one particular argument over standing in the PPACA case – which 
occurred in the briefs but which was rendered irrelevant when the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate – reveals a common tension in standing 
doctrine that will undoubtedly continue to influence future standing decisions. That 
is the tension between using standing as a tool to determine whether the plaintiff is 
a proper party,42 and using standing to maintain proper separation of powers 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (“[D]rive-
by jurisdictional rulings of this sort . . . have no precedential effect”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 
U.S. 343, 352, n. 2 (1996) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that the existence of unaddressed 
jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect”). 
 39. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at  94-95, 102; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 
(1984). 
 40. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007); Friends of the Earth v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 41. See generally Elliott, supra note 10. 
 42. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) 
(emphasizing the role of standing doctrine in “assur[ing] that the most effective advocate of 
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between the three branches of government.43 Those different uses of standing can 
conflict with one another. 
The Government, in its Brief on Severability, suggested that none of the parties 
had standing to seek severance of the statute, should the individual mandate be 
found unconstitutional. While the Government conceded that certain parties had 
standing to challenge the individual mandate,44 countless provisions of the PPACA 
injured no one who was a party to the case. According to the Government, then, if 
the Court found the individual mandate unconstitutional, it would lack jurisdiction 
to decide whether to sever the mandate from the rest of the statute.45 Instead, the 
Government argued, the rest of the statute would have to survive because the Court 
would lack the jurisdiction to do anything else.  
This argument picks up a standard refrain in standing doctrine: standing to seek 
one remedy does not give the party standing to seek any other remedies.46 Instead, 
standing must be shown for each remedy sought.47  
The PPACA challengers, however, argued that “severability is a remedial 
inquiry meant to effectuate Congress’ intent, not to redress a distinct injury to a 
plaintiff.”48 Thus, were the Court to invalidate the individual mandate, it could 
quite properly – and, the plaintiffs contended, would have to – move on to deciding 
whether the PPACA could survive without the mandate, even if no one had been 
injured by the other provisions of the statute. Only by considering severability 
could Congress’s interests be addressed. 
Who is right? Does each form of relief sought require a plaintiff with standing to 
seek that relief? Or are some forms of relief directed at other ends, such as 
preserving congressional prerogatives, so that standing is irrelevant to those forms 
of relief? The Court did not need to resolve this tension, because it found the 
mandate constitutional.49 Moreover, the right answer seems to be that given by H. 
Bartow Farr III, the court-appointed counsel on severability, who pointed out that 
                                                                                                                 
the rights at issue is present to champion them”). 
 43. According to the Court, standing “is built on a single basic idea—the idea of 
separation of powers.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 752. 
 44. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
 45. Brief for Respondents (Severability), Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566 (2012), 2012 WL 273133. 
 46. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12 (1983) (holding that, even though 
plaintiff Lyons had standing to seek damages for harm he suffered from a dangerous 
chokehold applied by the L.A. police, he lacked standing to seek to enjoin that practice 
because he failed to show a sufficient likelihood that he himself would again be subjected to 
a chokehold). 
 47. Id.; see also, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs, 528 U.S. 167, 
185 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief 
sought.” (citing Lyons)); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996) (“[S]tanding is not 
dispensed in gross.”). 
 48. Reply Brief for Private Petitioners on Severability, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 2012 WL 864595. 
 49. The Court did strike down a Medicaid provision also challenged in the same 
proceeding, but severability was actually not at issue there either, because the Medicaid Act 
specifically provides that the invalidity of one provision does not mean invalidity of any 
other Medicaid provisions. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607, 
2630 (2012) (both the majority opinion and Ginsburg’s opinion citing 42 U. S. C. §1303). 
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severability is not really a separate remedy requiring separate standing: “When the 
Court considers whether other, independently valid provisions of a statute should 
remain in force, it is not deciding a new ‘claim’ for relief, or a request for a 
‘different form’ of relief, both of which would require the plaintiffs to establish 
standing anew.”50 Instead, the severability analysis is part of granting the remedy of 
enjoining the operation of an unconstitutional statute.  
But the argument reveals a long-standing tension in the doctrine of standing. Is 
it a doctrine meant to guarantee that the plaintiff is the right person to bring the 
lawsuit? And, if so, are there constraints on what a court can do when a plaintiff’s 
standing is limited, no matter what the costs to other values, such as separation-of-
powers principles? Or is standing more about (or, more accurately, always also 
about) separation of powers, in which case separation-of-powers concerns can (at 
least in certain circumstances) overcome certain defects in an individual’s 
standing?  
The Court has given varied answers on this point. In opinions written by Justice 
Scalia, standing is a strict doctrine for the very reason that the requirements of 
injury in fact, causation, and redressability protect separation of powers.51 Yet the 
Court has also been more flexible when an adverse standing decision might 
diminish the legislative or executive branches. For example, in Friends of the Earth 
v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, the Court found standing based on pollution-
permit violations, even though the plaintiffs had not shown that any actual injury 
that would result from the violations.52 Justice Scalia dissented strongly, warning 
that allowing the suit to proceed had “grave implications for democratic 
governance.”53 But Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, made clear that to 
hold otherwise would be “to raise the standing hurdle higher than the necessary 
showing for success on the merits.”54 In other words, Congress (through its 
delegate, the Environmental Protection Agency) had set pollution limits using 
legislative power and had authorized citizens to sue to enforce those permit limits; 
to require a higher showing from plaintiffs to clear the standing hurdle would be a 
great intrusion by the courts on legislative authority. As I have written elsewhere, 
the Laidlaw Court “shows intense concern for a profoundly different conception of 
separation of powers [from that held by Justice Scalia]: that the Court cannot 
transform standing into a backdoor way to limit Congress’s legislative power.”55 
Certainly Justice Scalia was more willing to be flexible in the NFIB case than 
his previous opinions might have suggested. The dissenters, unlike the majority, 
did express an opinion on how the Court should treat the severability analysis, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability 
(Severability) at 20, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 2012 WL 
588458. 
 51. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (describing standing 
test as “irreducible constitutional minimum”). 
 52. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181–85. The Court relied on affidavits from the plaintiffs that 
they were scared to use the river due to the permit violations, and that their property values 
had declined due to fears of the contamination. Id. 
 53. Id. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 181. 
 55. Elliott, supra note 13, at 496 (citing Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 187). 
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despite any defects in standing: “The Federal Government, the States, and private 
parties ought to know at once whether the entire legislation fails.”56 
The PPACA case may have involved only “garden variety” standing issues.57 
But they were issues that were pervasive in the lower courts. It is thus surprising 
that the majority doesn’t refer to any standing issues at all. Does that avoidance of 
the issue suggest that the Court was worried that standing problems might well 
exist and were better off ignored, in favor of reaching the merits of an important 
national dispute? If so, then the Court might sub rosa have accepted a prudential – 
rather than a strict, inflexible, constitutional requirement – of standing. If so, the 
Court headed in the right direction.58 And, if so, it’s a shame that the Court did not 
say so outright. By not saying so and thus leaving the standing questions 
unaddressed, the Court added NFIB to the long list of cases that look like political 
manipulation rather than judicial reasoning. 
II. STANDING (IN GREAT DETAIL) IN THE MARRIAGE EQUALITY CASES  
In contrast to the health-care case, the marriage-equality cases decided by the 
Court in summer 2013 both discuss standing extensively, in Windsor finding 
standing and going on to strike down portions of the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA) on the merits,59 yet in Perry finding no standing to review 
California’s ban on same-sex marriage.60 Given extensive similarities in the 
procedural posture of both cases, the different standing outcomes are hard to 
reconcile. The unfortunate explanation for the differing outcomes is political: the 
Court wanted to get the federal government out of the marriage equality debate and 
leave it for the States.61 Thus the Court found standing and reached the merits in the 
DOMA case, while finding no jurisdiction in the California case. Unfortunately for 
standing doctrine, these results don’t make sense. 
A. United States v. Windsor 
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer met in 196362 and would have married, had a 
marriage between two women been legally permitted.63 They ultimately married in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (dissenting opinion of 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito).. 
 57. Elliott, supra note 2, at 588. 
 58. Elliott, supra note 13, at 510, 517. 
 59. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 60. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 61. I speak loosely when I refer to the Court: one group of Justices formed the majority 
in Windsor and a different group did so in Perry. The Court always acts through the votes of 
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Canada in 2007.64 Ms. Spyer died in 2009 and, because the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) forbade recognition of their marriage, Ms. Windsor was 
required to pay extra taxes in excess of $350,000 on Ms. Spyer’s estate, taxes a 
heterosexual couple would not have owed.65  
Ms. Windsor paid the excess taxes and then sued the United States for a refund, 
contending that DOMA violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the federal Constitution.66 Only a few months later, Attorney General 
Eric Holder announced that the Obama Administration had concluded that DOMA 
was unconstitutional; therefore, the United States would not defend the statute in 
court,67 though it would remain a party to facilitate a court ruling on the 
constitutionality of the law and would continue to enforce the law until it had been 
declared unconstitutional.68  
Who, then, would defend DOMA? The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
(BLAG) of the House of Representatives hired former Solicitor General Paul 
Clement and sought to intervene, which the district court permitted.69 The district 
court then ruled for Ms. Windsor on summary judgment, holding that DOMA 
violated rational basis review.70  
Continuing to agree that DOMA was unconstitutional, the United States 
nevertheless sought review of the district court’s opinion in the Second Circuit and 
also sought certiorari before judgment from the Supreme Court.71 The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court, but rather than applying 
rational basis review, the court held that sexuality was a quasi-suspect classification 
deserving of heightened scrutiny under the Constitution and that DOMA failed to 
survive under such heightened scrutiny.72 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 7, 2012, just two months 
after the Second Circuit’s decision. The Court specifically asked the parties to 
submit briefing on BLAG’s standing to participate and on the effect on the Court’s 
jurisdiction of the United States’ agreement with Windsor; four days later, the 
Court appointed Professor Vicki Jackson of the Harvard Law School to argue 
against jurisdiction.73  
The Court, in an opinion released on June 26, 2013, held that Windsor presented 
a case-or-controversy under Article III.74 While the majority (Justice Kennedy 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) acknowledged that the 
United States’ refusal to defend that law did “introduce a complication,”75 an 
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Article III case was nevertheless present because the United States was continuing 
to enforce the law: it was withholding from Ms. Windsor the $363,000 she sought, 
and the judgment requiring the United States to pay Ms. Windsor that money gave 
the U.S. “a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction.”76 The Court noted 
that INS v. Chadha had presented a very similar situation, and jurisdiction had been 
found there.77 
The Court did admit that the United States’ failure to defend DOMA raised 
prudential concerns: was the Court getting the kind of adversarial argument that 
would permit it to issue a judgment?78 The Court concluded that “BLAG’s sharp 
adversarial presentation of the issues satisfies the prudential concerns that 
otherwise might counsel against hearing [the] appeal.”79 The Court also 
emphasized the separation-of-powers issues that would arise if the Court could be 
ousted from jurisdiction simply because the President refused to defend a law: “the 
Supreme Court’s primary role in determining the constitutionality of a law that has 
inflicted real injury on a plaintiff . . . would become only secondary to the 
President’s.”80 Congress’s power would also be undermined: “it poses grave 
challenges to the separation of powers for the Executive at a particular moment to 
be able to nullify Congress’ enactment solely on its own initiative and without any 
determination from the Court.”81 
Having found jurisdiction present, the Court went on to find DOMA 
unconstitutional.82 The merits opinion is quite muddled, appearing to rest at times 
on a federalism argument (DOMA disrespects the states who have legalized 
marriage between same-sex couples)83 and at times on a due process argument 
(DOMA is supported by nothing more than irrational prejudice and thus cannot be 
justified, since it infringes on the liberty interests of same-sex couples and their 
children).84   
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito dissented on both 
the jurisdiction and merits issues. Justice Scalia, who has strong views on standing 
and the role of the Court in our government,85 assailed the majority for 
“aggrandiz[ing]” the power of the court over “the power of our people to govern 
themselves.”86 The majority, he said, “envisions a Supreme Court standing (or 
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rather enthroned) at the apex of government, empowered to decide all constitutional 
questions, always and everywhere ‘primary’ in its role.”87 Because Ms. Windsor 
and the United States agreed on the unconstitutionality of DOMA, Justice Scalia 
argued, this so-called case was instead “a contrivance, having no object in mind 
except to elevate a District Court judgment that has no precedential effect in other 
courts, to one . . . (in this Court) [that will have] precedential effect throughout the 
United States.”88 He then dissented at length from the Court’s merits opinion.89 
Justice Alito also dissented on the merits, but would have held that the Court 
had jurisdiction because of BLAG’s intervention.90 “[I]n the narrow category of 
cases in which a court strikes down an Act of Congress and the Executive declines 
to defend the Act, Congress both has standing to defend the undefended statute and 
is a proper party to do so.”91 
B. Hollingsworth v. Perry 
Slightly more than half of California voters voted yes on Proposition 8 (“Prop 
8”) on November 4, 2008,92 thus adding the following to the California 
Constitution: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.”93 About six months later, two gay couples challenged the new 
constitutional amendment by suing several California officials in federal court in 
San Francisco.94 The California officials (including then-Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger and then-Attorney-General Jerry Brown) appeared as parties but 
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refused to defend the law, and the district court allowed those who had promoted 
Prop 8 (“the Proponents”) to intervene.95 The district court ultimately struck down 
California’s gay-marriage ban as violating both the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.96 
No standing problem arose in the district court: the plaintiffs clearly had 
standing, and the California officials remained as parties, so that the status of the 
Proponents was not closely scrutinized. But when time came to appeal, the 
California officials declined to participate.97 Under Supreme Court precedent, the 
Proponents appeared to lack standing to appeal on their own.98 The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that, because Prop 8 arose through the California referendum and 
initiative process, California law would hold the answer to whether the Proponents 
were proper parties to pursue the appeal.99 It therefore certified to the California 
Supreme Court the question whether California law gave the Proponents standing 
to defend Prop 8 on appeal.100 
The California Supreme Court, in response, held that the Proponents were 
proper parties to represent the State of California in defending Prop 8.101 “We 
normally expect public officials to defend state statutes when their constitutionality 
is challenged in federal court, but when those officials decline to do so,” the 
California constitution and statutes “authorize the official proponents . . . to 
participate . . . in a judicial proceeding to assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s 
validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure.”102 In particular, the 
court noted, this is necessary because state officials may otherwise unfairly 
discriminate between laws enacted by the legislature and laws enacted by direct 
democracy: “the voters . . . may reasonably harbor a legitimate concern that the 
public officials . . . may not, in the case of an initiative measure, always undertake 
such a defense with vigor.”103 Importantly, the California Supreme Court did not 
address whether the Proponents had any individual stake in the litigation: the 
decision was based entirely on California’s initiative system and the Proponents’ 
role within that system. 
After receiving the answer to the certified question, the Ninth Circuit proceeded 
to find that the Proponents had standing in federal court to defend Prop 8.104 
Because states unquestionably have standing to defend the constitutionality of their 
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laws in federal court,105 and because “it is [the states’] prerogative, as independent 
sovereigns, to decide for themselves who may assert their interests and under what 
circumstances, and to bestow that authority accordingly,”106 the Ninth Circuit held, 
then “[a]ll a federal court need determine is . . . that the party seeking to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court is authorized by the state to represent its interest in 
remedying that harm.”107 California was injured in the Article III sense because its 
law had been invalidated; California, through its laws as interpreted by the 
California Supreme Court, had authorized proponents of a ballot initiative to 
defend that initiative; and so the Proponents were proper defenders of Prop 8 when 
the California officials had refused to do so.108 The Ninth Circuit went on to affirm 
the district court’s decision, although on considerably narrower grounds than 
provided by the district court.109 
Because the Ninth Circuit’s opinion relied with exceeding thoroughness on 
Romer v. Evans,110 a 1996 opinion written for the Court by Justice Kennedy, it was 
widely thought that the Ninth Circuit was trying to win Justice Kennedy’s vote in 
any review by the Supreme Court.111 The narrowness of the decision can also be 
interpreted as an effort to avoid Supreme Court review, an interpretation bolstered 
by a concurrence written by Judges Reinhardt and Hawkins in denying review en 
banc: 
We held only that under the particular circumstances relating to 
California's Proposition 8, that measure was invalid. In line with the 
rules governing judicial resolution of constitutional issues, we did not 
resolve the fundamental question that both sides asked us to: whether 
the Constitution prohibits the states from banning same-sex marriage. 
That question may be decided in the near future, but if so, it should be 
in some other case, at some other time.112 
This effort to evade review was ultimately, if circuitously, successful (although any 
effort to win Justice Kennedy’s vote on the merits was not). The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Perry on December 7, 2012, ordering special briefing on the 
question of the Proponents’ standing.113  
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The Court held that the Proponents lacked standing to appeal the opinion 
below.114 Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan, rejected the case on standing grounds. Any harm the Proponents felt at the 
invalidation of Prop 8, the Court held, was nothing more than a generalized 
grievance of the kind long found insufficient to support standing.115 They were not 
bound by the judgment below: “the District Court had not ordered them to do or 
refrain from doing anything.”116 While the Proponents were specially involved in 
getting Prop 8 on the ballot and campaigning for it, once Prop 8 became part of the 
California Constitution, the Proponents no longer had any special interest in it. 
They had no more standing to defend Prop 8 than any other citizen would have in 
seeing the laws vindicated. 
Nor could the Proponents obtain standing by claiming to represent the State of 
California. While, to be sure, California had suffered an injury in having its law 
invalidated, it had chosen not to appeal. The Proponents were barred by usual rules 
against “third-party” standing: I cannot bring suit to vindicate my neighbor’s 
interests—if she wants to sue, she can do it herself.  
Moreover, because the Proponents held no official position in state government, 
they lacked standing to represent California under Karcher v. May.117 In Karcher, 
leaders of the New Jersey legislature were authorized to represent the state in court 
when the state attorney general refused to do so. The leaders brought a lawsuit but 
were voted out of office while the case was pending. The Supreme Court held that, 
when they lost their offices, they lost standing to sue on behalf of New Jersey.118  
In applying Karcher to the Proponents, the Court emphasized that the legislative 
leaders “were permitted to proceed only because they were state officers, acting in 
an official capacity . . . . [Proponents] hold no office and have always participated 
in this litigation solely as private parties.”119 The Court similarly rejected 
Proponents’ standing under Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona.120 As I 
discuss in more detail below, the Court essentially ignores the role of state law in 
the analysis. Presumably the legislative leaders were proper parties in Karcher 
because New Jersey law made them so—and also determined that they could no 
longer sue on behalf of the state once they were no longer state officials. Similarly, 
in Arizonans, no state law made ballot-initiative supporters the proper parties to 
defend the ballot initiative in court. Here, by contrast, the California Supreme Court 
held that California law made the Proponents proper parties, and nothing had 
happened to change the Proponents’ status under California law. 
Finally, the Court held that the Proponents lacked standing because they claimed 
to be “agents” of California but were not agents under any standard definition of 
agency.121 This part of the opinion is the most obviously strained. The Proponents 
almost certainly referred to agency in their briefs because they thought they had to 
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under Arizonans, where the Court itself had sloppily used the term “agent” in 
rejecting standing for Arizonan ballot-initiative proponents. The concept of agency 
otherwise plays no important role in the Proponents’ argument. Nevertheless, the 
Court seized on the word and blew it up into a full argument under the Restatement 
of Agency.  
The Court concluded by emphasizing its respect for the California Supreme 
Court and the California initiative system. Yet, the Court said, “standing in federal 
court is a question of federal law, not state law. And no matter its reasons, the fact 
that a State thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a 
generalized grievance cannot override our settled law to the contrary.”122 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor, would have 
adopted the California Supreme Court’s view and allowed the Proponents to defend 
Prop 8 on appeal. Justice Kennedy started by acknowledging the truth of the 
Court’s statement: “a proponent’s standing to defend an initiative in federal court is 
a question of federal law.”123 But, Justice Kennedy wrote, the federal requirements 
were satisfied by the Proponents. First, California “sustained a concrete injury, 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III, when a United States District 
Court nullified a portion of its State Constitution.”124  
Second, Justice Kennedy argued, the State Executive does not have the last 
word in determining whether to litigate to redress that injury; California has an 
initiative system precisely to allow the People to act despite the preferences of their 
elected officials, and the California Supreme Court held that the Proponents were 
proper parties to represent the State in court when the state officials refused to do 
so.125 It is not for the United States Supreme Court to tell California that it must 
adopt an agency theory in determining who can represent it in court; an agency 
relationship would be particularly problematic in this case—who would the 
principal be? The Governor or the Attorney General, both of whom wish to 
acquiesce in the district court’s judgment?126 Moreover, Justice Kennedy pointed 
out, other similar litigation arrangements have long been recognized as proper 
under Article III.127  
Thus Justice Kennedy and three of his fellow Justices would have held that the 
Proponents are proper appellants and that the Court has jurisdiction.  
C. What Can We Learn from the Marriage Equality Cases? 
The marriage equality cases, just like the health-care case, show that the Court 
does in fact use standing to manipulate its jurisdiction, reaching or avoiding the 
merits as it chooses. Even more than the health-care case, the marriage equality 
cases reveal the problems inherent in using standing doctrine to try to vindicate 
separation-of-powers interests: in both Windsor and Perry, both sides have strong 
separation-of-powers arguments that the standing doctrine does little to clarify. In 
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the end, the marriage equality cases provide strong support for the arguments I 
have made elsewhere: standing should be severely reined in or even abandoned, 
and the Court should shift to a prudential abstention doctrine in determining its 
jurisdiction.128 
1. Lesson One Redux 
Like the PPACA case, the marriage equality cases support the view of standing-
as-manipulation.129 The differing outcomes on standing in Windsor and Perry are 
best explained by naked politics: the Court wanted to strike down DOMA to get the 
federal government out of the marriage-equality debate, but wanted to avoid 
making any decision that would impose marriage equality on the States. Thus 
standing in Windsor but no standing in Perry.  
It is no accident that the first sentence of Perry refers to the “active political 
debate” over marriage equality. The blogosphere suspected that the Court might 
duck in Perry because of the high level of political activity surrounding marriage 
equality. (Not long before Perry issued, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Minnesota all 
passed statutes recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marry; ballot initiatives 
to recognize or to ban marriage between same-sex couples are pending in as many 
as eleven states as of this writing.)  
And at least one Justice had made clear her reluctance to become involved in 
issues subject to active political debate among the States. Justice Ginsburg gave 
speeches in 2008 and 2012 emphasizing the negative effect Roe v. Wade had had 
on the Court’s position in American society, because Roe short-circuited 
democratic debate over abortion.130 Her 2012 speech was seen as signaling her 
reluctance to make Perry the Roe of marriage equality: better for the Court to stay 
out of the debate and let the States hash it out over the next decade.131 
Ironically, however, the Court’s standing decision in Perry has the effect of 
short-circuiting democratic debate in California, by leaving in place the district 
court’s decision striking down Prop 8 and leaving the People of California without 
a means to challenge that decision.132 As Justice Kennedy stated in dissent:  
There is much irony in the Court’s approach to justiciability in this 
case. A prime purpose of justiciability is to ensure vigorous advocacy, 
yet the Court insists upon litigation conducted by state officials whose 
preference is to lose the case. The doctrine is meant to ensure that 
courts are responsible and constrained in their power, but the Court’s 
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opinion today means that a single district court can make a decision 
with far-reaching effects that cannot be reviewed. And rather than 
honor the principle that justiciability exists to allow disputes of public 
policy to be resolved by the political process rather than the courts, here 
the Court refuses to allow a State’s authorized representatives to defend 
the outcome of a democratic election.133 
Justice Alito, who would have found jurisdiction in both cases, found Perry a much 
easier case than Windsor because of California’s initiative system. He noted the 
paradox presented by the Court’s decision to find standing in Windsor but to deny 
it in Perry: “It is remarkable that the Court has simultaneously decided that the 
United States, which received all that it had sought below, is a proper petitioner in 
[Windsor] but that the intervenors in Hollingsworth, who represent the party that 
lost in the lower court, are not.”134 
Should the Court have found standing in Perry? The case does raise a number of 
unusual concerns.135 In particular, there is a misfit between the Proponents’ use of 
the legislative process against a historically oppressed minority, and their use of the 
courts to defend that legislation. Under footnote four of Carolene Products, the role 
of the courts is to protect the minority, not to give the majority a forum.136 Had the 
Court based its reluctance to review Prop 8 on such concerns, I might have found 
its opinion more persuasive. But, of course, standing doctrine does not leave room 
for such concerns. 
A prudential doctrine of standing would allow such concerns to be addressed 
explicitly.137 Instead, the Court tries to shoehorn its concerns about intervening in a 
hot topical issue into the strictures of the standing doctrine, which is poorly 
equipped to serve that purpose. As a result, the Court, in trying not to look political, 
ends up looking political. 
2. Lesson Two Redux: Standing is Still a Bad Tool for Vindicating Separation-of-
Powers Concerns 
The marriage equality cases both presented unusual standing problems. We are 
usually worried about plaintiff standing (as, for example, in the health-care case): is 
someone seeking judicial action from the federal courts when they do not actually 
raise a case or controversy? We do not usually worry about the defendant’s 
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standing, presumably because defendants risk suffering adverse judgments.138 And 
certainly a defendant facing an adverse judgment would have standing to appeal.139 
But in Perry, the defendants bound by the adverse judgment chose not to appeal, 
and in Windsor, the defendant bound by the adverse judgment agreed with the 
judgment against it. It might appear that, under conventional standing doctrine, a 
case or controversy did not exist. This cannot, of course, create or defeat 
jurisdiction: many defendants are happy with the judgments against them, when the 
judgments are for piddling amounts, or leave undisturbed things the defendant 
cares more about. Defendants may even default, so that judgment is entered against 
them without their participating at all. 
At the same time, both Perry and Windsor involved adversity in a larger sense. 
Even if the Governor and Attorney General of California declined to appeal the 
district court’s judgment, the People of California arguably suffered an injury (they 
had, after all, voted by a majority to enact Prop 8 into law). As I argued in my 
earlier piece in the Indiana Law Journal: “To permit ballot initiatives to change the 
law by direct democratic vote, but to have no mechanism by which those initiatives 
can be defended in court, makes hollow the promise of direct democracy.”140 
Similarly, in Windsor, the Obama Administration refused to defend DOMA, but 
Congress (or at least BLAG) wanted to defend it. Allowing the Executive to 
acquiesce in the invalidation of federal law, but not allowing Congress to step in 
defend that law, creates a gap in our legal system. Justice Scalia, in his Windsor 
dissent, contended that Congress had all the tools it needed to defend itself when 
the Executive refused to defend: it could use appropriations, oversight, and 
ultimately impeachment to attempt to control the President.141 Yet this ignores the 
role the district court has already played in striking down DOMA: surely the 
appropriate supervisor of the district court is ultimately the Supreme Court, and the 
appropriate review of the district court’s opinion is by appellate review, rather than 
through some tangential slanging match between the Hill and the White House. 
 The real problem here may be with the Supreme Court’s holding in Diamond v. 
Charles that standing must be present at all stages of litigation.142 I hope to argue 
elsewhere that, so long as standing is present through the district court’s entry of 
judgment, appellate review is within the judicial power delineated by Article III as 
part of the higher courts’ supervisory powers, regardless of whether standing 
continues to be present.143 
Taking a step even further back, both Windsor and Perry show the hopelessness 
of trying to use standing doctrine to resolve separation of powers debates. Everyone 
had a good separation of powers argument: Should a lower court’s opinion striking 
down a congressional enactment go unreviewed? Should the Executive get to divest 
the Supreme Court of jurisdiction by acquiescing in the lower court’s opinion? 
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Should the Executive get to create jurisdiction in the Supreme Court by refusing to 
pay Ms. Windsor her money while agreeing she deserved it? Should the Supreme 
Court get to reach out and grab a big political decision by ignoring the strictures of 
Article III? Should the Executive Branch of California get to undermine the 
initiative system by refusing to defend Prop 8 in court? Should a lower federal 
court get to strike down a state constitutional enactment with no oversight? Should 
ballot initiative proponents get to step into the shoes of the State with no constraints 
or supervision?  
Only a one or two these questions really have anything to do with injury-in-fact, 
traceability, or redressability. Instead, these questions are about the appropriate 
roles of legislatures, executives, and courts, and about the relationship between the 
federal courts and the states. Both Windsor and Perry would have been better 
opinions if they had engaged those issues directly, rather than through the filter of 
standing doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
I suggested in my earlier Indiana Law Journal article that “[t]hese new cases … 
present opportunities for the Court to alter existing doctrine in ways long argued for 
by liberals: the courts should be more broadly accessible, and the strange-
bedfellows moment presented by these cases might cause the Court to grant that 
access.”144 Unfortunately, the Court did not seize this opportunity. Instead, it 
further confused an already confusing doctrine. 
The health-care case arguably made the courts more broadly accessible on an 
issue of great national importance, but the Court gave no reasoning to support 
similar access in the future. The marriage equality cases were so transparently 
political in their application of the standing doctrine that they give ammunition to 
those who think that the Court sits as a super-legislature. Standing, at least in these 
opinions, continues to be a “cover” for improper analysis145 and a “word game 
played by secret rules.”146 
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